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SOCIAL BACKGROUNDS

AND DISSENTING

BEHAVIOR ON THE NORTH DAKOTA.
SUPREME COURT 1965-1971
STEVEN CANN*

In June 1972, the United States Supreme Court rendered a decision in the case of Furman v. Georgia,1 which contained five
concurring and four dissenting opinions considering whether capital
punishment is cruel and unusual. The question may be asked, how
can nine experienced lawyers have such varied interpretations of
the Constitution? Regardless of how the question is put, the problem
can be conceptualized as follows: The cases represent inputs into
the judicial system (or subsystem), out of which the decisions are
the output. In the judicial model, the cases are roughly similar
yet often substantially different decisions are produced.2 One possible way to account for the variation in these decisions is to analyze
the judges' social and political background.

There have been numerous attempts to predict judicial behavior
by correlating social background variables with judicial decisions.3
Stuart Nagel found the Democratic judges tend to favor: the defen-

dant in criminal cases; the administrative agency in business regulation cases; the claimant in unemployment compensation cases;
* Graduate student, Political Science, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana.
1. 408 U.S. 288 (1972).
2. For example see Alberg Sonit, Joseph Tanenhaus, and John Whalke, "Aspects of
Judicial Sentencing Behavior," University of Pittsburg Law Review, Vol. 21 (June, 1960),
pp. 613-619.
3. For just a few examples, see the following: David W. Adamany, "The Party Variable
in Judges' Voting: Conceptual Notes and a Case Study," American Political Science Re'View, Vol. 63 (March, 1963, pp. 57-73; Stuart S. Nagel, "Ethnic Affiliations and Judicial
Propensities," Journal of Politics, Vol. 24 (1962), pp. 92-110; "Political Party Affiliation
and Judges' Decisions," American Political Science Review, Vol. 55 (1961), pp. 843-853;Sidney S. Ulmer, "Dissenting Behavior and the Social Backgrounds of Supreme Court
Justices," Journal of Politics, Vol. 32 (1970), pp. 580-598; and Donald R. Matthews, The
Social Back grounds of Political Decision-Makers (New York: Random House, 1954); B.
Canon and D. Jaros, "Factors Relating to Dissent Rates on Supreme Courts: (paper delivered at the Midwest Political Science Convention, Ann Arbor, Michigan, April 24, 1969;
J. B. Grossman, "Social Backgrounds and Judicial Decision-Making." Harvard Law Review,
Vol. 79 (1966). DD. 1551-1564.
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and the employee in employment injury cases.4 Don R. Bowen
found that judges who were: Democrats, non-Protestant, low-status,
younger, and long-tenured (as a judge) displayed greater support
for criminal defendants than did judges with opposite characteristics. 5 He found similar associations in civil liberty appeals, business-regulatory appeals, labor-management cases, debtor-creditor
and landlord-tenant appeals.
In a 1970 article, Sidney Ulmer outlined similar findings between judicial backgrounds and dissenting behavior.6 This article
will limit the discussion of background characteristics as they relate
to dissenting behavior on the North Dakota Supreme Court.
If different backgrounds have a tendency to be associated with
different decisions in assorted types of cases, then it might follow
that a court of judges with similar backgrounds should be a relatively cohesive one. The North Dakota Court provides an available
opportunity to test the background influence theory. The backgrounds
of the present North Dakota Supreme Court justices are remarkably
similar.
All five judges are Republican, Protestant, and members of
the American Bar Association. All but Judge Erickstad who is 49
are over 50 years of age, and each has been on the Supreme
Court for over five years. Except for Judge Erickstad they received
their pre-legal and legal educations in North Dakota. Erickstad attended the University of Minnesota during the final year of undergraduate work and received his law degree from that institution.
Each of the present members of the Court was either an individual
practitioner or a member in a small law firm. Only one of the
justices has had prior judicial experience and only one has not
been a public prosecutor. Chief Justice Strutz is the only member
of the Court to practice law in a large town (over 10,000 is a
large town for the purposes of this study). Finally, each of the
judges comes from similar parentage. Their fathers' occupations
are as follows: two were farmers, one was a minister, another
a restaurant owner, and one was a lawyer.
The present Court was created in 1967 with the election of Judge
William Paulson. He replaced William Murray, a Democrat and
Roman Catholic, in 1966. During Murray's nine month tenure on
the Court, we might expect the Court to be less cohesive or at
least we should see an increase in the dissent rate. Judge Murray's
demographic data are similar in all respects to the other members
4. Nagel, "Political Party Affiliation," p. 845.
5. Don R. Bowen, "An Explanation of Judicial Voting Behavior from Sociological Characteristics of Judges," Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1965, p. 41.
6. Sidney Ulmer, "Dissenting Behavior and the Social Backgrounds of Supreme Court
Justices," Journial of Politics, Vol. 32, No. 3, August, 1970.
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of the Court except for political party and religious affiliation. This
has the effect of holding all other background characteristics constant while controlling for religion and political party.
Judge Thomas Burke preceded Judge Murray on the Court.
We will examine part of Judge Burke's tenure from 1965 to 1966.
Burke's demographic characteristics are entirely different in nearly
all respects from any of the other judges. He was a Democrat
and a Roman Catholic and was educated in the public schools of
Washington, D. C., and to a limited extent in North Dakota. He
received his undergraduate degree from Harvard and apprenticed
for his law training; had been a member of the Court for 25 years
and was 67 years old by 1965. The next most tenured judge had
been on the Court for five years-the next oldest was 61.
Finally, Burke came from a more upper class parentage than
the other judges. Burke's father was a partner in one of North
Dakota's most prestigious law firms and was a former governor
of North Dakota. His father served as treasurer of the United States
under Woodrow Wilson, had a stock brokerage in New York, and
served on the North Dakota Supreme Court for thirteen years. It
is expected that Judge Burke would display markedly different voting behavior from Judge Murray who in turn should vote differently
than any of the present members of the Court.
In accordance with the above discussion of the influence of
background variables and in the light of the apparent cohesiveness
of the North Dakota Court, the following hypotheses will b6 tested.
1. Because of the similarity of the backgrounds of the judges,
7
the present court will have a low rate of dissent.
2. Because of the differences in their backgrounds, Judges
Burke and Murray will dissent more frequently than the rest of
the judges. Therefore the Court will have a higher rate of dissent
during the periods which Burke and Murray were members of the
Court.
3.

There will be no significant dissenting blocs.

As outlined above, the purpose of this study is to examine the
impact of social and political background characteristics upon dissenting behavior. In an attempt to accomplish that, the composition
of the North Dakota Supreme Court has been separated into three
time periods (the Burke Court, 1965-April, 1966; the Murray Court,
7. Burke, Murray and the present Court are terms used to distinguish between the time
periods in which the make up of the Court was different. Judges Teigen, Strutz, Knudson,
and Erlckstad were on the Court during the entire seven-year period under study. The
terms Burke, Murray, and present Court refer to those time periods when Judges Burke,
Murray and Paulson, respectively, completed the make up of the court.
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May-December, 1966; and the Court, 1967-1971). Judges Teigen, Knudson, Strutz and Erickstad were members of the Court
during the entire seven years under study and their backgrounds
are similar. The three judges who constitute the fifth member of
the Court in three different time periods are Burke, Murray, and
Paulson. The composition of the Courts during the first time period
(1965 and the first four months of 1966) is as follows: Burke, Teigen,
Strutz, Erickstad, and Knudson. Because Judge Burke's background
differs radically from the other four members of the Court this
time period will be referred to throughout this study as the Burke
Court.
Judge Burke died in April of 1966 and William Murray was
appointed to take his place. Judge Murray's background differs
significantly from his colleagues in party identification and religious
affiliation. For identification purposes, the second time period (May
through December, 1966) will be referred to as the Murray Court
and consists of Judges Murray, Teigen, Strutz, Erickstad, and Knudson.
Judge Murray was replaced in January of 1967 by William Paulson who defeated him in the general election. Paulson's demographic
characteristics are similar to those of Teigen, Strutz, Erickstad,
and Knudson. The above five judges constitute the membership
of the Court during the third time period (1967 - 1971). This time
period will be referred to as the present Court. The table on the
next page displays the differences in the social and political backgrounds of the judges.
During the seven year period under study, the North Dakota
Supreme Courrt resolved 566 cases 8 (an average of 80.9 cases
per year). According to the literature, there are certain types of
cases which are more susceptible to analysis (in terms of attitudinal
behavior) than others. 9 The following are the types of cases used
in this study:
criminal cases, personal injury cases, tax cases, government regulation cases, debtor-creditor cases, landlord-tenant cases, and insured
versus insuror cases.
The findings for the first hypothesis (that the North Dakota
Supreme Court will have a low rate of dissent) are as follows:
The total number of dissents range from a low of eight in 1965
and 1966 to a high of 14 in 1968, 1970, and 1971. Taking into consideration all seven years, the Court averages 10.9 dissents per year.
8. This is the total of actual written opinions. It does not Include rehearings and various other cases which come before the Court but do not require written opinions for disposal.
9. For example see, Nagel, "Political Party Affiliation," pp. 844-845; and Jerry K.
Beatty, "Decision-Making on the Iowa Supreme Court-1965-1969," Drake Law Review,
May 1970, pp. 350-351.
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TABLE I
BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS OF NORTH DAKOTA
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 1965-1971
Erickstad

Teigen

Strutz

Rep.

Rep.

Rep.

Cath.

Prot.

Prot.

Prot.

Pre-legal
Education

Harvard

N.D.

N.D.

N.D.

Legal
Education

Apprenticeship

N.D.

N.D.

Minn.

69

62

67

.27

11

No

Prosecuting
Experience

Membership

Burke
Political
Party
Religion

Age in 1971

Dem.

Knudson

Murray

Paulson

Rep.

Dem.

Rep.

Cath.

Prot.

N.D.

N.D.

N.D.

N.D.

N.D.

N.D.

48

67

49

11

8

6

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Firm
-

Individual
raotice

Firm

Firm

Prot.

Tenure on

N.D. Supre

9 months

59

5

Court
Prior
Judicial
Experience

in ABA
Type of Law
Practice
Initial
Means of
Accession
to Court
Father's
Oocupation

Elected

Appointed Appointed

Politician Farmer

Elected

Elected

Farmer

estaurant

$5,000
(1937)

Firm

ndividual
Practice

Appointed Elected
Lawyer

Lawyer

Owner

and Judge

Estimated

from
Worth
Martindale-

Minister

ndvidual
Practice

Unknown

30,000-

30,000-

20,000-

50,000

50,000

30,000

Rural

Rural

(1957)

(1961.)

(196)

50,000

100,000
(166)

50,000-

100,000
(1966)

Hubb.e
Size of
Town Practiced in

Urban

Rural

Urban

Urban

Rural

The rate of dissent ranged from a low of 5.94 in 1966 to a
high of 15.39 in 1968.0 The average rate of dissent for the seven
year period is 9.22. To determine whether that is a high or low
rate of dissent, there should be some figures for comparison. A
ten year study of the South Dakota Supreme Court indicates an
average dissent rate of 16.7 with a range from 8.7 in 1958 to 28.0
in 1965.11 The ten year period of the South Dakota study was from
10. Rate of dissent is computed by dividing the yearly number of dissents by the total
yearly opinions written. Conventionally this is done by using the total number of dissenting
votes rather than the number of dissents. However, for comparative purposes the total dissents are used here.
11. Kenneth A. Wagner, "Decisional Predilections and Leadership Patterns on a State
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1957 to 1967. For the last three years of that period a trend of
higher dissent rates is visible (28.0, 24.2 and 27.5). A similar pattern
is apparent on the Iowa Supreme Court. 12 In the Iowa study Jerry
Beatty found that the dissent rate from 1960 to 1964 averaged 9.7
while by 1969 the rate of dissent had climbed to 26.1. In only one
year (1968) did the North Dakota Court have a dissent rate above
10%. Table II compares the dissent rates for the North Dakota
Court over the seven year period.
TABLE 11
CASES AND DISSENTS 1965 - 1971

OF THE NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT
1967

1968

1969

1970

1971

Total

Average

10!.

97

65

62

80

83

566

80.9

6

6

10

6

8

8

50

7.14

7.69 5.94 6.19 15.39

9.68

10.0 9.64 64.53

9.22

1965

1966

78
6

Number of
Written Opinions
Number of Dissents
Ratio

The South Dakota Supreme Court wrote 568 opinions from 1957
through 1967. There was a total of 95 dissents resulting in 133 dissenting votes. By comparison, between 1965 and 1971 the North
Dakota Court produced 566 written opinions (only two less than
the South Dakota Court for a shorter period of time). The North
Dakota Court, however, rendered only 76 dissenting votes from 50
dissents.
The United States Supreme Court has a dissent rate of about
50 per cent. 13 The Iowa Court presently dissents at a rate of about
25 per cent, 1 and the South Dakota Court maintains an average
dissent rate of 16.7. Considering that the North Dakota Court dissents at an average rate of 9.22 per cent, it does not seem unrealistic
to maintain that the North Dakota Court has a low rate of dissent.
It was predicted that Judges Burke and Murray would dissent
more frequently than the other judges. The data indicates that that
prediction is not substantiated. Table III demonstrates that Justices
Teigen, Knudson, and Strutz dissent most frequently while Burke
and Murray registered the fewest dissents during the period under
study. Table IV indicates that the Burke and Murray courts do
not display a higher rate of dissent than the present court.
Supreme Court: An Exploration-The Case of South Dakota 1957-1967"
for seminar in Judicial Process, University of Iowa, 1968), p. 18.
12. Beatty, "Iowa Supreme Court", pp. 342-367.
13. Wagner, "South Dakota Supreme Court", p. 16.
14. Beatty, "Iowa Supreme Court", p. 343.

(unpublished paper
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TABLE III
JUDGES AND DISSENTING VOTES
Total
Number
of Cases
Participated in

Burke
Teigen
Strutz
Erickstad
Knudson
Murray
Paulson
Totals

Total
Number

of

Dissenting

votes

68
563
544
545
515
54
357

2
32
12
6
17
0
6

Ratio of
Participation to
Dissenting

Votes

2.94
5.68
2.21
1.10
3.30
0.00
1.68

75a

2,646

Single
Dissents

Ratio of
Single
Dissents
to Total
Dissenting

Votes

0
13
5
2
4
0
0

0
40.63
41.67
33.33
23.53
0
0

24

TABLE IV
CASES AND DISSENTS FOR THE THREE COURTS

Number of Written Opinions

Number of Dissents
Ratio

Burke
Court
(1965)

Murray
Court
(1966)

Present
Court
(1967-71)

Total

87

92

387

566

8

4

38

50

9.20%

4.35%

9.82%

11.3%

Average Rate of Dissent=7.79.

Perhaps the small number of participations accounts for the
few dissents from Judges Burke and Murray. During the year and
three months in which Judge Burke is included in this study, he
was ill with cancer and consequently only took part in 68 of a
possible 87 opinions. Judge Murray was on the Court for a period
of only nine months (April through December which includes the
summer months during which the Court is in recess). On the South
Dakota Court, however, Judge Rudolph only participated in 32 cases
and still managed to register two dissents.
It was also predicted that there would be no significant dissenting blocs, but the evidence from Table V indicates that there are
two dissenting blocs on the present court.
According to Schubert, an index of cohesion of .40 to .49 indicates the existence of a moderate bloc, 15 while anything above
.50 represents a strong bloc. The evidence, from the above bloc
analysis, indicates a strong dissenting bloc between Judges Teigen
a. The total number of dissenting votes is actually 76. One dissenting vote was cast
by a substituting District Court Judge.
15. Glendon A. Schubert, "Quantitative Analysis of Judicial Behavior." (Glencoe, Ill.; the
Free Press, 1959).
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TABLE V
BLOC ANALYSIS OF UNDERDOG CASES 1967 - 1971
Erickstad

Paulson

Strutz

Knudson

Teigen

Total
Dissents

Erick-stad

0

1

0

0

0

1

Paulson
Strutz

1
0

0
0

0
2

1
0

0
5

2
7

Knudson
Teigen

0
0

1
0

0
5

4
8

8
5

13
18"

Outer bloc: I. Ch.=.35 (weak)
Tiner bloc: I. Ch.--.46 (moderate)
Teigen-Strutz: I. Ch.=.83 (strong)
and Strutz and a moderate bloc between Knudson and Teigen.
So far, the data indicates that the North Dakota Court is cohesive as evidenced by the low dissent rate. It has been demonstrated that the two judges who were expected to dissent most
frequently did not do so. Further there is evidence of two dissenting
blocs on the Court where none were expected.
The fact that over 90 per cent of its decisons are unanimous
attests to the cohesiveness of the North Dakota Supreme Court.
It is questionable, however, that social and political background
variables alone account for the Court's cohesion. During the seven
years under study the dissent rate has always been low regardless
of the composition of the Court. The different backgrounds of Judges
Burke and Murray did not significantly affect interagreement on
the Court.
One possible explanation for the cohesiveness of the Court may
be found in the state's legal culture, (specifically the type of cases
which most often come before the Court). Legal culture is that
phenomena which makes the practice of law and the judicial system
somewhat different from state to state. The classic example is the
difference between Louisiana (Civil Law) and the rest of the states
(Common Law). However, there are more subtle differences from
state to state. Some of the factors which account for these differences in legal culture are: the type of litigation most frequently
occurring (which could be a function of the economy of a state),
the structure of the court system, the influence of various bar
associations, and judicial selection and tenure.
Most cases appealed to the North Dakota Court do not involve
those questions of law which tend to expose differences in judicial
philosophy. Rarely is the Court asked to determine the constitutionality of a state law or to determine legislative intent. When criminal
*Dissenting votes in the bloc analysis do not equal 75 because only the following types
of cases were analyzed: Criminal, personal injury, government regulation, Insured v. insuror, debtor-creditor, and landlord-tenant.
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cases involving constitutional issues were isolated, they contained
nine out of the total eleven dissents in criminal cases. In 1970
the Court decided four cases involving the free exercise or establishment clauses of the first amendment. In two of those cases, there
were four dissents.16 In another case the majority opinion was
signed by only two of the five judges. 7 The other three judges
wrote separate concurring opinions. A similar pattern is apparent
in reapportionment cases."'
It is evident then, that there are differences in judicial philosophy on the Court. But it is also evident that those differences do
not usually surface except in cases involving controversial issues.
If North Dakota's legal culture helps to explain the low dissent
rate, perhaps the next question is what accounts for North Dakota's
legal culture. Why is it that the North Dakota Supreme Court has
an opportunity to decide so few cases involving controversial social
or political issues. The answer to that might be found in the state's
political culture. Similar to the concept of legal culture, political
culture refers to that phenomenon which makes politics in North
Dakota different from politics in, for example, New York.
The state is a sparsely populated and rural oriented one. There
are no major metropolitan areas and the state is not highly industrialized. The ethnic composition of the state appears to be homogeneous and therefore there is a lack of competition between the
political parties (North Dakota has a modified one-party political
system) .19 In such a culture, one would expect a lack of political
challenge (in all branches of government) and therefore a lack
of political change. Two examples of a lack of political challenge
in this state are long tenure for public officials and a one-party
dominated legislature. There is a history of long tenure for public
office holders in the state. Governor Guy, both U. S. Senators,
and Representative Andrews are good examples. Since at least 1964
both houses20 of the state legislature have been over 70 per cent
Republican.
The political culture argument is reinforced by Jacob and Vines
who suggest that certain aspects of political culture have a high
positive correlation to legal professionalism. 21 The authors developed an index of legal professionalism for the states, part of which
16. City of Bismarck v. St Mary's Church, 181 N.W.2d 713 (N.D. 1970) and City of
Bismarck v. Materi, 177 N.W.2d 530 (N.D. 1970).
17. Lutheran Campus Council v. Board of County Commissioners, 174 N.W.2d 362 (N.D.
1970).
18. State v. Cass County, 158 N.W.2d 687 (N.D. 1968) and Stearns v. Twin Butte Public
School District No. 1, 185 N.W.2d 641 (N.D. 1971).
19. Austin Ranney, "Parties in State Politics," in Politics in the American States, ed. by
Herbert Jacob and Kenneth Vines (2nd ed.: Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971), p. 87.
20. Ihid., p. 167.
21. Jacob and Vines, "State Courts," ibid., pp. 291-292,
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consisted of several aspects of the judicial system. Some of these
aspects of the judicial system which led to a high rating on the
legal professionalism index were as follows: high salaries and long
tenure for judges; judicial selection based on the Missouri plan
or some variation of it; more than five judges on the Supreme
Court; a well financed and well staffed judicial system; a court
system which avoided unnecessary duplication and joint jurisdiction;
and an intermediate appellate court. Jacob and Vines maintain that
a high degree of legal professionalism correlates positively to a
22
high dissent rate. The state ranked 25 in legal professionalism.
The authors summarize the relationship between political culture
and legal professionalism as follows:
In general, states that ranked highest appear to be urban
and industrial. . . . Legal groups have been most successful
in bringing modern legal orientations into judiciaries in
wealthier, urban states with social and economic heterogeneity. Greater legal professionalism is also present in those
states with more partisan competition and political innovation. In addition, we find that legal and legislative professionalism tend to occur together in the states and represent
aspects of modernization and political development. Quite
likely modernization is correlated with the growth of an urban
industrial society and the development
of professional orien28
tations toward political institutions.
The authors found several positive correlations for dissent rates
with political and legal cultural variables. They found high dissent
rates on courts with more than five judges and also in those states
which have intermediate appellate courts. 24 Both of the above factors are found in complex political cultures. As stated above, they
found various cultural factors were related to legal professionalism
and, in turn, legal professionalism correlates positively with dissent
rates.
For example, the five states with highest dissent rates
in 1966 also have high legal professionalism scores. This relationship suggests that the propensity to state dissents is
an outgrowth of modernization of state courts. As the states
develop modern and socially complex societies, their court
systems, as we have shown, become more legally professionalized. Judges on such courts become more aware of social
conflict and less insulated by traditional legal orientations.
When traditional legal methods fail to resolve conflicts on
the courts, state judges2express disagreement more frequently by dissenting votes. 5
22. Ibid., p. 292.
23. Ibid., pp. 292-293.
24. Ibid., p. 302.
25. Ibid., p. 303.
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While the Court is a cohesive one with relatively few dissents,
there is a pattern to dissenting behavior. There is a strong dissenting
bloc consisting of Judges Teigen and Strutz. The findings of the
bloc analysis were reinforced by the results of personal interviews
with four of the justices of the Court. 26 During those interviews
the members of the Court expressed an awareness of differences
in judicial philosophy on the Court. It was indicated that a liberal
bloc consisted of Judges Paulson, Erickstad, and Knudson. Disagreement over the proper judicial role is apparently the cause of the
split .on the Court. All four judges interviewed indicated that the
legislature, not the court, was the proper institution for initiation
of change. Apparently, however, Judges Teigen and Strutz are more
adamant on that point than their colleagues. In the case of Kunze
v. Stang, Judges Paulson, Erickstad and Knudson took it upon themselves to rewrite the guest statute for the state legislature.2 7 The
justices of the Supreme Court were asked to cite several cases
which they felt were representative of their judicial philosophy.
Four cases were chosen from that list which appeared to be representative of the philosophical differences on the Court.2 8 In each
case either Judge Teigen or Judge Strutz, or both, have dissented.
Their dissenting opinions object to the Court's intrusion into an
area in which they feel the Court should not be involved.
In conclusion, it would appear that background characteristics
are a poor predictor of dissenting behavior for the North Dakota
Supreme Court. It was hypothesized that the Court would be a
cohesive one and this was supported by evidence of a low dissent
rate. However, the rate of dissent did not increase with the introduction of varied backgrounds. Therefore, it would seem that the
low dissent rate on the North Dakota Court is a function of the
state's legal culture rather than the background characteristics of
the judges.
26. Chief Justice Strutz had just ggotten over an illness and unfortunately could not be
present for an interview.
27. Kunze v. Stang, 191 N.W.2d 526 (N.D. 1971).
A guest driver and the owner of a car occupied the front seat and two guest passengers were in the back seat. The car took a curve at 80 miles per hour and one of the
guest passengers in the back seat requested the driver to slow down. The car's owner
(sitting In the front seat next to the driver) indicated that his car was capable of handling
at speeds up to 90 miles per hour. The car did not slow down and shortly thereafter the
car crashed killing both the driver and the owner.
The guest passengers sued the owner's estate for personal injuries received as a result of the accident.
According to state statute and previous state court opinions, the driver's estate was
liable, but not the owner's estate.
In this case the Supreme Court said that since the owner had displayed negligence
and had an opportunity to control his car, he was liable.
Chief Justice Strutz dissenting with Judge Teigen said, "The majority have, by
their opinion, repealed the guest statute, which the legislative assembly has repeatedly
refused to do."
28. Kunze v. Stang, 191 N.W.2d 526 (N.D. 1971), Simon v. Woodland, 179 N.W.2d 422
(N.D. 1970), Fournier v. Roed, 161 N.W.2d 458 (N.D. 1968), and Geo. E. Haggart, Inc. v.
North Dakota Workman's Compensation Bureau. 171 N.W.2d 104 (N.D. 1969).
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There is also evidence of dissenting blocs on the Court. This
was unexpected because of the similarity in judges backgrounds.
The evidence indicates that what differences there are on the Court
are indicative of differences in judicial philosophy or role rather
than background characteristics. Further research is needed to account for the differences in judicial philosophy evidenced on the
North Dakota Court, since the above findings indicate that demographic characteristics do not appear to be involved.

